Introduction
To introduce the logics we will be working with in this paper, we start with an example loosely based on the one from [17] . Let us imagine that Ann, Bob, and Cath are travelling by train from Nottingham to Liverpool through Manchester. Cath was sound asleep all the way, and she has just woken up. She does not know whether the train passed Manchester, but Ann and Bob know that it has not. Now, if the train driver announces that the train is approaching Manchester, then Cath, as well as Ann and Bob, knows that they have not passed the city yet. To reason about changes in agents' knowledge after public announcements, we can use Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [16] . Returning to the example, let us assume that the train driver does not announce anything, so that Cath is not aware of her whereabouts. Ann and Bob may tell her whether they passed Manchester. In other words, Ann and Bob have an announcement that can influence Cath's knowledge. An extension of PAL, Group Announcement Logic (GAL) [2] , deals with the existence of announcements by groups of agents that can achieve certain results. Now, let us assume that Ann does not want to disclose to Cath their whereabouts and Bob does, i.e. Ann and Bob have different goals. Then, it is clear that no matter what Ann says, the coalition of Bob and Cath can achieve the goal of Cath knowing that the train has not passed Manchester, that is, Bob can communicate this information to Cath. On the other hand, if Ann and Bob work together, then they have an announcement (for example, a tautology 'It either rains in Liverpool or it doesn't') such * This is a corrected version of [13] . The previous version considered CoGAL, a combination of CAL and GAL without relativised operators. There is a gap in the completeness proof of CoGAL given in [13] . Specifically, the proof of the Lindenbaum Lemma (Proposition 2. 19) fails to demonstrate that when adding a witness ψ G for ¬η i ( [ G ] ϕ i ), we also have all the corresponding formulas with χ A\G (which is required by the semantics). Completeness of CoGAL is hence an open question. In this corrected version we consider relativised group announcement operators instead of GAL operators. This allows us to give a sound and complete axiomatisation of CoRGAL. We omit Propositions 2.11 and 2.12 of [13] that also have errors in proofs. We would like to acknowledge discussions with Hans van Ditmarsch and Tim French that helped us to identify and correct the errors.
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that whatever Cath says, she remains unaware of her whereabouts. For this type of strategic behaviour, another extension of PAL -Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) -has been introduced in [3] .
CAL joins two logical traditions: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, of which PAL is a representative, and Coalition Logic (CL) [15] . The latter allows us to reason about whether a coalition of agents has a strategy to achieve some goal, no matter what the agents outside of the coalition do. CL essentially talks about concurrent games, and the actions that the agents execute are arbitrary actions (strategies in one-shot games). So, from this perspective, CAL is a coalition logic with available actions restricted to public announcements.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no complete axiomatisation of CAL [3, 11, 4, 5] or any other logic with coalition announcement operators. In this paper, we consider Coalition and Relativised Group Announcement Logic (CoRGAL), a combination of an extension of GAL and CAL, which includes operators for both group and coalition announcements. The main result of this paper is a sound and complete axiomatisation of CoRGAL. As part of this result, we study the interplay between group and coalition announcement operators, and partially settle the question on their interaction that was stated as an open problem in [11, 5] .
Coalition and Relativised Group Announcement Logic

Syntax and Semantics
Throughout the paper, let a finite set of agents A, and a countable set of propositional variables P be given. The language of the logic is comprised of the language of classical propositional logic with added operators for agents' knowledge K a ϕ (reads 'agent a knows ϕ'), and public announcement [ψ]ϕ (reads 'after public announcement that ψ, ϕ holds'), relativised group announcement [G, χ] ϕ ('given some announcement χ, whatever agents from G announce at the same time, ϕ holds afterwards'), and coalition announcements [ G ] ϕ ('for every public announcement by coalition of agents G there is an announcement by other agents A \ G, such that ϕ holds after joint simultaneous announcement').
Definition 2.1. (Language) The language of coalition and relativised group announcement logic L CoRGAL is as follows:
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, G ⊆ A, and all the usual abbreviations of propositional logic (such as ∨, →, ↔) and conventions for deleting parentheses hold. The dual operators are defined as follows:
Observe that G, ψ ϕ means that G has an announcement such that after announcing it in conjunction with ψ, ϕ holds, and [G] ϕ means that G has an announcement such that after it is made simultaneously with any announcement by A \ G, ϕ holds. The latter corresponds to the Coalition Logic operator, but for announcements instead of arbitrary actions.
We define L RGAL as the language without the operator [ G ] , L PAL the language without [G, ψ] as well, and L EL the purely epistemic language which in addition does not contain announcement operators
Next definition is needed for technical reasons in the formulation of infinite rules of inference in Definition 2.5. We want the rules to work for a class of different types of premises. Ultimately, we require premises to be expressions of depth n of the type
for some a ∈ A and ψ ∈ L CoRGAL , atom denotes a placement of a formula to which a derivation is applied, and some ϕ's and 's can be omitted. This condition is captured succinctly by necessity forms originally introduced by Goldblatt in [14] . Definition 2.2. (Necessity forms) Let ϕ ∈ L CoRGAL , then necessity forms [14] are inductively defined as follows:
The atom has a unique occurrence in each necessity form. The result of the replacement of with ϕ in some η( ) is denoted as η(ϕ).
Whereas formulas of coalition logic [15] are interpreted in game structures, formulas of CoRGAL are interpreted in epistemic models. Let us consider an example of such a model first. In Figure 1 there 
. Now, we provide formal definitions.
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• ∼: A → P(W ×W ) assigns an equivalence relation to each agent; we will denote relation assigned to agent a ∈ A by ∼ a ;
• V : P → P(W ) assigns a set of states to each propositional variable.
A pair (W, ∼) is called an epistemic frame, and a pair (M, w) with w ∈ W is called a pointed model.
Generally speaking, an updated pointed model (M ϕ , w) is a restriction of the original one to the states where ϕ holds.
Let L G EL denote the set of formulas of the type i∈G K i ϕ i , where for every i ∈ G it holds that ϕ i ∈ L EL . We denote elements of L G EL as ψ G . These are the formulas we will be quantifying over in modalities of the form [G, χ] and [ G ] .
The semantics for the 'diamond' versions of knowledge and public announcement operators ( K a ϕ and ϕ ψ) respectively) are obtained by changing ∀ to ∃ and 'implies' to 'and' in the corresponding lines. The semantics for duals of relativised group announcements and coalition announcements is as follows:
The existential version of the coalition announcement operator is read as 'there is an announcement by agents from G, such that whatever other agents A \ G announce at the same time, ϕ holds.' Note that semantics of coalition announcement operators are given in a 'classic' way. An equivalent definition is possible using relativised group announcements.
We can use relativised group announcements to define classic group announcements:
Following [8, 7, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 4] we restrict formulas which agents in a group or coalition can announce to formulas of L EL . This allows us to avoid circularity in the definition.
Axiomatisation and Some Logical Properties
In this section we present an axiomatisation of CoRGAL and show its soundness. It is based on the axiom systems for PAL, and have two additional axioms and four additional rules of inference.
Definition 2.5. The axiom system for CoRGAL is an extension of PAL with a relativised version of GAL and interaction axioms.
So, CoRGAL is the smallest subset of L CoRGAL that contains all the axioms A0 -A11 and is closed under rules of inference R0 -R6. Elements of CoRGAL are called theorems. Note that R5 and R6 are infinitary rules: they require an infinite number of premises. Finding finite axiomatisations of any of APAL, GAL, or CAL is an open problem. Note also that CoRGAL includes coalition logic [15] , that is all the axioms of the latter are validities of CoRGAL and a rule of inference preserves validity (see Appendix A). Definition 2.6. (Soundness and completeness) An axiomatisation is sound, if for any formula ϕ of the language, it holds that ϕ ∈ CoRGAL implies ϕ is valid. And vice versa for completeness.
Soundness of A0-A4, R0, and R1 is due to soundness of S5. Axioms A5-A9 and rule of inference R3 are sound, since PAL is sound [12] . We show soundness of R3-R6 in Proposition 2.8, and validity of A10 and A11 in Proposition 2.7.
Proposition 2.7. Axioms A10 and A11 are valid.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of semantics (Definition 2.4). We just show validity of (A11).
Assume that for some arbitrary pointed model
Since ψ G quantifies over all epistemic formulas known to G, we can choose any particular ψ G . Hence, we have that [11, 5] . We partially settle this problem by proving one direction.
Consider the left-to-right direction of the formula. In the antecedent all agents make a simultaneous announcement, whereas in the consequent agents from A \ G know the announcement ψ G made by G. Thus, in the updated model (M ψ G , w) the agents in A \ G may have learned some new epistemic formulas χ A\G that they did not know before the announcement. However, since ψ G holds in the initial model, and χ A\G holds in the updated one, agents from A \ G can always make an announcement in the initial model that they know that after announcement of ψ G , χ A\G is true.
Returning to our example (Figure 1 
Due to restriction of announcements to formulas of epistemic logic, we cannot directly employ public announcement operators in agents' 'utterances.' In order to avoid this, we use the standard translation of PAL into epistemic logic. [12] is defined as follows:
Proof. Assume that for some pointed model (M, w) it holds that (M, w) |= [G] ϕ. By the semantics of CAL this is equivalent to
Since χ A\G quantifies over all possible announcements by A \ G, it also quantifies over a specific subset of these announcements -
Note that K A\G [ψ G ]χ A\G is not an epistemic formula per se. It is equivalent, however, to an epistemic formula of type K A\G χ A\G , where χ A\G ∈ L EL , via translation t(K A\G [ψ G ]χ A\G ) (Definition 2.9). Thus we have that
Let us consider announcement
. By propositional reasoning it is equivalent to
Since ψ G is an epistemic formula, the latter is equivalent to
Finally, we have that
where χ A\G ∈ L EL . The latter is equivalent (M, w) |= G [A \ G]ϕ due to validity |= ψ ∧ [ψ]ϕ ↔ ψ ϕ and by the semantics of GAL.
Intuition suggests that various groups and coalitions of agents, when united, can do no worse than if they were acting on their own. In the remaining part of this section we show that this intuition is indeed true.
We start with a somewhat obvious statement: if some configuration of a model can be achieved by a coalition, then the configuration can be achieved by a superset of the coalition.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.2.
It was shown in [2] that G ϕ ↔ G G ϕ. This property demonstrates that within the framework of GAL a multiple-step strategy of a group can be executed in a single step. Whether this is true for CAL is an open question. We show, however, that if truth of some ϕ can be achieved by two consecutive coalition announcements by G, then whatever agents from A \ G announce, they cannot preclude G from making ϕ true.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.3.
ϕ is valid is an open question. We conjecture that the property is not valid. Consider [G] [G] ϕ: after initial announcement, coalition G has a consecutive announcement to make ϕ true. This announcement, however, depends on the choice of A \ G in the first operator. In other words, consecutive announcement by G may vary depending on the initial announcement by A \ G. Hence, it seems highly counterintuitive that G has a single announcement that can incorporate all possible simultaneous announcements by A \ G in a general (infinite) case.
Formula G H ϕ → G ∪ H ϕ is a validity of GAL [2] . Again, it is unknown whether the same property holds for coalition operators, and, for the same reasons as for Proposition 2.12, we conjecture that the corresponding formula is not valid in CAL. 
Next, we show that splitting an announcement by a unified coalition into consecutive announcements of sub-coalitions may decrease their power to force certain outcomes. Whether [G ∪ H] ϕ → [G] [H] ϕ is valid was mentioned as an open question in [5] . We settle this problem by presenting a counterexample.
Proposition 2.14. 
Completeness
In order to prove completeness of CoRGAL, we expand and modify the completeness proof for APAL [7, 9, 6] . Although the proof is partially based upon the classic canonical model approach, we have to ensure that construction of maximal consistent theories (Proposition 2.20) allows us to include infinite amount of formulas for cases of coalition announcements. This is possible due to axioms A10, A11 and rules of inference R5, R6. After that we use induction on complexity of CoRGAL formulas to prove the Truth Lemma.
First, we prove a useful auxiliary lemma.
is a theorem as well.
Proof. Appendix, Lemma B.4. Now, the first part of the proof up to Proposition 2.20 is based on [7] . Here we introduce theories and prove the Lindenbaum Lemma. Definition 2.17. A set of formulas x is called a theory if and only if it contains CoRGAL, and is closed under R0, R5, and R6. A theory x is consistent if and only if ⊥ ∈ x, and is maximal if and only if for all ϕ ∈ L CoRGAL it holds that either ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Note that theories are not closed under necessitation rules. The reason for this is that while these rules preserve validity, they do not preserve truth, whereas R0, R5, and R6 preserve both validity and truth.
Proposition 2.18. Let x be a theory, ϕ, ψ ∈ L CoRGAL , and a ∈ A. The following are theories:
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.5.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.6
The following proposition is a variation of the Lindenbaum Lemma. In order to prove it, we rely heavily on rules of inference R5 and R6.
Lemma 2.20 (Lindenbaum). Every consistent theory x can be extended to a maximal consistent theory y.
Proof. Let ψ 0 , ψ 1 , . . . be an enumeration of formulas of the language, and let y 0 = x. Suppose that for some n ≥ 0, y n is a consistent theory, and x ⊆ y n . If y n + ψ n is consistent, then y n+1 = y n + ψ n . Otherwise, if ψ n is not a conclusion of either R5 or R6, y n+1 = y.
If ψ n is a conclusion of R5, we enumerate all the subformulas of ψ n which contain relativised group announcement modalities [G, χ] .
be all these subformulas. Then y 0 n , . . . , y k n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y 0 n = y n , and for some i < k, y i n is a consistent theory containing y n and ¬η i ( [G, χ] 
, and y n+1 = y k n . Note that adding such a witness ψ G corresponds to the semantics of relativised group announcements, i.e. for formula
Now we consider the case when ψ n is a conclusion of R6. We enumerate all the subformulas of ψ n which contain coalition announcement modalities [ G ] .
be all these subformulas. Then y 0 n , . . . , y k n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y 0 n = y n , and for some i < k, y i n is a consistent theory containing y n and
, and y n+1 = y k n . Note that since for all
are theorems, these formulas and their contrapositions (due to Proposition 2.16) are already in y i n (because y i n is a theory). Thus, adding
This satisfies the semantics of coalition announcements, i.e. for formula η i { [G] ¬ϕ i } we have some ψ G such that for all
Finally, y is a maximal consistent theory, and x ⊆ y.
The rest of the proof is an expansion of the one from [9] . It employs induction on complexity of formulae to prove the Truth Lemma (Proposition 2.27 ) and, ultimately, completeness (Proposition 2.28) of CoRGAL.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.7.
• W C is the set of all maximal consistent theories,
Relation ∼ C is equivalence due to axioms A2, A3, and A4.
Proof. Suppose H(ϕ) holds, and let x be a maximal consistent theory. The proof is by induction on <
Size
[,],[ ] -complexity of formulae. Most of the cases were proved in [9] . We prove here only the remaining instances involving realtivised group and coalition announcements.
Since x is a theory, by axiom A10 we have that ∀ψ G : [G, χ] ϕ and the Induction Hypothesis, we have
ϕ is a necessity form. Since x is a maximal consistent theory and, hence, closed under R5, we conclude that ∀ψ G :
Next, by Proposition 2.23 and the Induction Hypothesis we have that
Since x is a theory and by axiom A11 we have that ∀ψ G : [ G ] ϕ and the Induction Hypothesis, we have
ϕ is a necessity form. Since x is a maximal consistent theory and, hence, closed under R6, we conclude that ∀ψ G :
Proposition 2.26 implies the following fact. Proposition 2.27. Let ϕ ∈ L CoRGAL , and x be a maximal consistent theory. Then ϕ ∈ x iff (M C , x) |= ϕ.
Finally, we prove the completeness of CoRGAL. Proposition 2.28. For all ϕ ∈ L CoRGAL , if ϕ is valid, then ϕ ∈ CoRGAL.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ϕ is valid and ϕ ∈ CoRGAL. Since CoRGAL is a consistent theory, and by Propositions 2.18 and 2.19, we have that CoRGAL + ¬ϕ is a consistent theory. Then, by Proposition 2.20, there exists a maximal consistent theory x ⊇ CoRGAL + ¬ϕ such that ¬ϕ ∈ x. By Proposition 2.27, this means that (M C , x) |= ϕ, which contradicts ϕ being a validity.
Conclusion
We presented CoRGAL and provided a complete axiomatisation for it. Validity of [G] 
has also been proven. Whether the other direction valid is an open question. Answering it either way, positively, or negatively, will allow us to understand better mutual expressivity of CAL and GAL. The axiomatisation of CoRGAL we presented is infinitary and employs necessity forms. Finding a finitary axiomatisation is yet another open problem. An interesting avenue of further research is adding common and distributed knowledge operators to CoRGAL in the vein of [1] . Additionally, since it is known that GAL, CAL [5] , and hence CoRGAL, are undecidable, a search for decidable fragments of these logics is another research question. We would also like to investigate applicability of logics with group and coalition announcements to epistemic planning [10] . Finally, a complete axiomatisation of CAL without relativised group announcement operators has not been provided yet, and it is an intriguing direction of further research. Proof. Suppose that for some (M, w) it holds that (M, w) |= [G] [G] ϕ. This is equivalent to
Since χ A\G quantifies over all epistemic formulas known to A \ G, it also quantifies over A\G := a∈A\G K a . Hence it is implied that
which is equivalent to
Next, we use PAL validity [ψ]ϕ ↔ (ψ → ψ ϕ):
By propositional reasoning the latter implies
and this implies ∃ψ G , ∀χ A\G , ∃ψ G : (M, w) |= χ A\G → ψ G ∧ χ A\G ψ G ϕ.
Finally, by PAL axiom ψ χ ϕ ↔ ψ ∧ [ψ]χ ϕ, we have that
We can move ∃ψ G within the scope of ∀χ A\G , and morph ψ G and [ψ G ∧ χ A\G ]ψ G into a single announcement by G.
The latter is (M, w) |= [ A \ G ]ϕ by the semantics of CAL.
